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Abstract
In the most general sense, the modern idea of history is a conceptual tool de-
ployed in order to domesticate experienced novelty and expectations of the
future. In Western modernity, the operation we usually call historicization has
been nothing other than an operation of temporal domestication: the integration
of experienced and expected novelty into a larger processual scheme we as-
sociate with modern historical time. Based on these theoretical considerations,
this article has a dual objective. First, through an analysis of historical approaches
to the Anthropocene—that exemplifies present-day perceived radical novelty—
it attempts to identify the linguistic-conceptual means of temporal domestication
through historical time. Second, it raises the question of the politics of historical
time today by focusing on the evaluative aspects of temporal domestication in an
age when the future increasingly appears a threat. As a brief conclusion, the article
calls for broader recognition of what it calls a plurihistoricity of “historical”
transitions, the co-existence of multiple kinds of transformation and change over
time.
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History as a means of temporal domestication
If you watch movies, you are likely to recognize the trope of the Ignored Expert. It
was heavily deployed in the resurgence of movies revolving around natural
catastrophes in the 1990s and the early 2000s. TV Tropes, a wiki-like website
dedicated to the exploration of film and television tropes, defines the Ignored
Expert (2020) as “a scientist or expert who predicts a major disaster to happen, but
is not believed by his contemporaries.” The Ignored Expert even has a “natural
enemy,” the Suit with Vested Interests (2020), who, as the name of the trope
already suggests, has a vested interest “in something that’s going to suffer if the
disaster comes about.” Although many other characters contribute to the un-
folding of disaster movie plots, there is only one left that I would like to mention.
It is the Obstructive Bureaucrat (2020), who has but one job: “to get in the way of
whatever the heroes need to do.”
Today, when impending catastrophes seem to surpass cinematic imagination,
we may easily recognize the real-world equivalents of film tropes—even though
both the tropes and the prospects of catastrophes may be slightly different. To
begin with, the catastrophe has become “anthropogenic” and “planetary.” The
threat of natural disasters did not disappear—asteroid impacts and volcano
eruptions are expected to happen just as before—but the most perilous threats
have acquired an anthropogenic character, including natural ones. Rogue artificial
intelligence (Bostrom, 2014), human enhancement and bioengineering (Hall,
2017) going awry, and the mass extinction of species due to human activity
(Kolbert, 2014; Leakey and Lewin, 1996) have become major anticipated or
ongoing catastrophes driven by human activity in the last decades. The most
broadly debated anthropogenic “existential risks” and “global catastrophic risks”
(Bostrom and Cirkovic, 2008) of the day are nevertheless human-induced climate
change in particular and the transformation of the Earth system due to human
activity in general. Although the two sound deceptively alike, the conceptual gap
between them is massive. As Thomas (2019) warns, we had better not confuse the
particular issue of climate change with anthropogenic Earth system trans-
formations: whereas the former is a problem that demands a solution to work
toward, the latter is a predicament and condition we cannot escape. Earth system
science captured the latter with the notion of the Anthropocene (Crutzen and
Stoermer, 2000), which has been quickly turned into a broader social, cultural,
and political predicament by the humanities and social sciences (Horn and
Bergthaller, 2019).
In this context, the (rather imperfect) real-life equivalent of the film trope of the
expert can be linked with Earth system science (ESS): the science that cuts across
disciplinary confines in studying the Earth as one system of interacting spheres.
Yet, the expert here is no longer “ignored.” Although climate change denial most
certainly exists (even at the highest political levels), the work of ESS in raising
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awareness of a systemic human-induced transformation of the planet in general
and anthropogenic climate change in particular has been yielding results. True
enough, the results are partial. Whereas popular protests are growing, effective
policy-level mitigation of anthropogenic catastrophes seems to conflict with the
agendas of certain Suits with Vested Interests. And there is typically little doubt
about their role and identity. To name but one, according to Hamilton (2010: xiv),
“the most immediate reason for ‘our’ failure to act on global warming has been the
sustained and often ruthless exercise of political power by the corporations who
stand to lose from a shift to low- and zero-carbon energy systems.”
The focus of the coming pages, however, will be on what I think is a major real-
life equivalent of the Obstructive Bureaucrat trope: the very idea of history as it
has been developed in Western modernity. This is not to say that all kinds of
history obstruct action in the urgency of today’s anthropogenic crises. My claim is
confined to the modern idea of history. That said, I do not wish to claim that all
histories based on modern historical thinking are flawed, that keeping on telling
developmental histories of how we got here is completely useless, or that ap-
pealing to the modern idea of history deliberately gets in the way of mitigating
catastrophic futures. In many respects, long-term developmental histories of how
we got here can still yield important insights, and historians have good arguments
to support the view that a historical focus can be beneficial in many respects, from
climate adaptation (Adamson et al., 2018) to climate justice (Meyer and
Sanklecha, 2017). I am simply interested in those instances in which this is
not the case, in which modern historical thinking falters.
I hope to show that the historical focus—as based on the tenets of modern
historical thinking—is not always beneficial and that there is an extent (rapidly
expanding and gaining prominence) to which it may even be obstructive and
harmful. This article is devoted to bringing that extent to light without denying
that there are good arguments for the continuing relevance of conventional modes
of modern historical thinking in various human endeavors. Clarifying thereby on
the scope and limitations of this essay, what I wish to claim is that historicizing
experienced novelty as based on the central tenets of the modern idea of history
inevitably functions as the obstruction of action today under the following two
conditions: when (1) the future appears catastrophic (Horn, 2018) and (2) so-
ciopolitical action aims at avoiding the worst futures instead of aiming at bet-
terment over time (Simon, 2019: 79–103).
To see what I mean, let me begin by defining the modern Western idea of
history as a conceptual tool deployed in order to domesticate experienced novelty
by integrating it into a processual scenario of development. Looking at history
this way brings together certain insights of Reinhart Koselleck, Hannah Arendt,
and Hayden White in a comprehensive view that likely none of them would hold.
First, it affirms the view of Koselleck (2004) that it is in modernity (in Neuzeit)
that the divide between past experiences and future expectations opened up and
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a perceived novelty in human affairs began to occur. Second, it agrees with
Arendt’s claim (1961: 63) that processual thinking that renders individual things
and occurrences meaningful by seeing them as parts of larger processes is the
greatest invention of the modern period. Third, it complements White’s (1987:
58–82) emphasis of history’s domesticating function although in a significantly
modified version. White’s view of domestication is concerned with the aesthetic
aspect of semantics in historiography; he states that professional historical writing
beautifies the sublime chaos of reality by imposing meaning on it. My claim is not
confined to professional historical studies but is related specifically to temporal
domestication through a scheme of a developmental process.
In the coming pages, I hope to provide an insight into the workings of temporal
domestication. The aim is not to rehearse my earlier theoretical arguments on what
happens when the old idea of history meets newer types of novelty (Simon, 2019),
but to explore how exactly temporal domestication happens in the encounter. I am
aware of how this might sound rather controversial. Have not we learned from
Koselleck (2004) that modern historical time is the one that opens up to the future,
being concerned with constantly occurring novelty? We certainly have. Yet, it is
much less frequently pointed out that modern historical time opens to the future and
enables the occurrence of novelty only in order to render the new familiar by
making it appear as a necessary future development of an already effective past
potential and by presenting a story of continuous developmental processes in which
the new unfolds out of the old. In focusing on this latter aspect, I hope to show that
a retained commitment to modern historical time is counterproductive when ap-
plied to the novel types of radical novelties we are facing today.
Following a brief introduction of the theme of historical time, I will sketch the
conceptual and linguistic means through which temporal domestication occurs,
by virtue of modern historical time providing the condition of possibility of
temporal comparisons. In the next steps, I will return to the Anthropocene as the
most prominent instance of radical novelty that Earth system science attempts to
capture, and venture into analyzing the conceptual and linguistic means through
which historical thinking temporally domesticates the Anthropocene. In the
analysis, I will pay special attention to the evaluative aspects of temporal do-
mestication by playing out how it deflates the future. Finally, in place of
a conclusion, I will call for a broader recognition of kinds of transformation and
change over time in the historically oriented approaches of the humanities and
social sciences by coining the term plurihistoricity to account for the multiplicity
of “historical” transitions.
Historical time in the plurality of times
The modern idea of history as a temporal construct and a specific way of
conceiving of change over time in terms of processual developments has been
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subject to severe criticism over the last decades on several grounds. Most recently,
in making the case for recognizing the plurality of modern experiences of time,
Fryxell (2019: 290) has warned that “modern time cannot be reduced to a single
framework or methodology like Koselleck’s historicity or the proliferation of
clock technologies and the decline of sacred time.” In Fryxell’s view, if we want
“to understand the complex experiences of time in the recent past, we must be
open to alternative, non-chronological and not strictly linear perspectives on time,”
meaning that “we must embrace pluritemporality.” Whereas Fryxell’s aim to
explore the pluritemporality of modern time experiences seems timely (so to
speak), I do not think that Koselleck as the main target of criticism would
protest. For what Koselleck tried to understand was not “modern time” in
general but a specifically modern experience of time as a “historical,” a specif-
ically modern “historical time.”
However, one may still ask, why would there be only one kind of historical
time? There are sound reasons to believe that not only is modern time pluri-
temporal, but even a specifically historical time should not mean one monolithic
conception of time experienced as “historical” (Tamm and Olivier, 2019). Ac-
cording to Jordheim (2014), modern historical time itself harbors “multiple
temporalities” with respect to the pace and tempo of processes, traces of which
have typically been covered by enhancing the plurality of historical times into
synchronizing categories such as that of “progress.”
Further down the line, one may even ask, why should we talk about modern
experiences of time of theWestern kind? For as soon as we widen up spatially, we
are confronted with multiple temporalities from “indigenous temporality” in
relation to climate change (Rowland, 2019) to historical time in Chinese historical
thinking (Huang and Henderson, 2006). And as soon as we broaden up temporally
and look beyondmodernity and consider more contemporary experiences of time,
we are confronted with a plethora of “historical” ways in which past, present, and
future are related to each other in recent societal practices over various domains of
human endeavor. Inside and outside the Western world, reparations of historical
injustice, reconciliation, and the politics of recognition challenge the central tenet
of modern historical time, specifically that a temporal distance separates past and
present (Bevernage and Lorenz, 2013; Fareld, 2019; Torpey, 2003). At the same
time, Hartog (2015) argues that we are already leaving modern times in
a comprehensive manner, shifting from a future-oriented modern “regime of
historicity” to a presentist one in which we extend the present point of view over
both the past and the future. Finally, my recent efforts have been directed at
capturing a new historical sensibility and new temporality emerging in recent
technological and ecological prospects through the notion of “unprecedented
change,” referring to abrupt and unfathomable transformations kicked off by
game-changer events (Simon, 2019).
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Paying attention to multiple conceptions of historical time and pluritempor-
alities, however, should not delude us into thinking that modern historical time
and the modern idea of history are no longer deeply embedded in our everyday
dealings, within and outside academia. Modern historical time is not gone; it has
only become one of the pluritemporalities we came to embrace, making any effort
to navigate among such pluritemporalities extremely complicated. We have
become able to consider times in the plural, but still have tremendous difficulties
recognizing and acknowledging their limitations in their respective reach and
scope. In fact, we routinely conflate these multiple temporalities.
In what follows, I would like to pay attention to the most pertinent instance of
such conflation: our tendency to approach emerging new phenomena that belong
to non-modern time regimes through the prism of modern historical time. I will
explore the linguistic-conceptual means by which we keep projecting the old
scheme of developmental processes over newer kinds of radical future and
novelty by calling the operation temporal domestication.
Temporal domestication and temporal comparability
The domestication of the future and its radical novelty is specifically temporal
inasmuch as it situates novelty in time. The means of temporal domestication are,
however, conceptual and linguistic. Conceptually and linguistically subsuming the
new under the old requires three steps. Although the steps are oftentimes not exposed
explicitly, they are necessary features of the temporal domestication of the new in the
sense of the three of them hanging together: detecting the presence of one implies
that the other two are also put into effect. Having this in mind, let me get to the steps.
The first step of temporal domestication is the broad (re)description of the
encountered radical novelty. When concepts are not yet developed with the
intention of capturing the novelty, one can simply describe it in terms of an
existing broad category. When concepts are already developed to capture the
newness of whatever has been encountered or identified as being the case, then
those concepts are typically deemed inaccurate just in order to subsume the new
under a broader redescription. The more loosely the novelty is defined, the easier
it becomes to link it with past occurrences or to find precedents to it in the second
step. Linking the new with the old involves temporal markers responsible for
establishing the connection to past occurrences. Such markers of temporal do-
mestication typically have an explicit time reference that situates the new with the
old in a way that indicates familiarity between the two.Words such as “always” or
“precedent,” for instance, function as such markers. Sometimes, however, the
temporal marker is simply a statement on how that which others perceive as new
is actually not. Finally, as soon as the new is reinterpreted in broader terms and
temporal markers are put into effect, it becomes possible to establish continuity
between old and new, between past and future, in the third step.
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Once again, the three steps are (1) a broad (re)description of novelty until it
ceases to appear new, (2) the deployment of temporal markers, and (3) the es-
tablishment of continuity. While the goal of this article is not to justify that
temporal domestication through history happens but to analyze how it happens
through a discussion of a very few examples of domesticating the novelty of the
Anthropocene, perhaps it makes sense to quickly indicate the former. The ca-
pacities attributed to recent bio-, nano-, and artificial intelligence technologies
either to create greater-than-human superintelligence or to transcend human
biological limitations through human enhancement in transhumanist thought
provide a context extremely rich in domestication efforts coming not only from
professional historians but from multiple knowledge formations. In temporal
domestication, technoscientific prospects of other-than-human beings of human
creation that greatly outperform human beings become contemporary instances of
broadly redescribed occurrences, phenomena and categories already known and
already conceptualized.
Hence the claim of Jasanoff (2016: 73–74) that “humanity’s dreams of the
future have always been posthuman” and that the story of Daedalus and Icarus
testifies that “the technological has arguably always been part of the posthuman
dream”; hence the claim of Mossman (2011: 233) that “human enhancement is
nothing new” and that “for thousands of years, humans have used natural products
such as caffeine and tobacco to change moods and behaviors and to improve
cognition”; and hence the claim of Adrienne Mayor that “ideas about making
artificial life – and qualms about replicating nature – were explored in Greek
myths” and that “beings that were ‘made, not born’ appeared” in stories ranging
from the one about Jason and the Argonauts to “the evil fembot created by
Hephaestus” and thus “represent the earliest expressions of the timeless impulse
to create artificial life.” Mayor is cautious enough to warn that her otherwise
fascinating Gods and Robots (2018: 4) does not intend to “suggest direct lines of
influence from myth or ancient history to modern technology.” At the same time,
however, the claim that the stories of the book “reveal the surprisingly deep roots
of the quest for life that is made, not born” (Mayor, 2018: 6) makes it clear that
a broad definition of “life that is made, not born” serves the purpose of fitting
recent AI prospects with ancient myths in a manner that suggests that the former is
an update on the latter that assumes a deep continuity between old and new.
The establishment of continuity has a crucial function: it creates the condition
of possibility of temporal comparison, meaning that investigating temporal
domestication amounts to an inquiry into the conceptual-linguistic fashioning of
temporal comparability. Comparing past states of affairs or conditions to present
or expected future states of affairs or conditions is possible only inasmuch as the
comparison concerns the past, the present, and the future of an identifiable subject
that goes through change over time. The retained self-identity of the subject in all
its temporal states provides the element of continuity, while the different newly
Simon 7
occurring conditions of the subject account for the element of change. There we
have processual historicity as a combination of continuity of change of a peculiar
kind. As soon as continuity is established by fitting the new with the old and the
known, the latest novelty provided by the element of change—first appearing
fresh, shocking, and radical—cannot but occur as tamed and domesticated.
All three tenets of temporal domestication—broad (re)definition, temporal
markers, and continuity—feature in the examples I want to consider a bit more
closely. The larger discussion on the Anthropocene perfectly illustrates the
workings of temporal domestication: first, the concept of the Anthropocene has
been coined to capture radical novelty (so that there is an existing notion to
domesticate by redefinition); second, the growing recognition of the Anthro-
pocene is typically accompanied by claims concerning how it reconfigures ex-
isting knowledge (so that temporal domestication should at least be suspicious as it
necessarily appeals to existing states of affairs and forms of knowledge). To avoid
misunderstanding, my primary intention here is not to argue for the novelty of the
Anthropocene. My claim is that the Anthropocene is perceived and conceptually
captured as radical novelty in its formulation in ESS, and I hope to show how
a specific kind of historical thinking domesticates that perceived novelty. My
argument is about the function of modern historical thinking, regardless of any
explicit position one might take in the overall Anthropocene debate.
The ESS anthropocene
To be able to see temporal domestication at work, the first thing to consider is the
subject of domestication: the radical novelty of the Anthropocene. As every effort
at sense-making and meaning constitution already domesticates novelty, naming
the Anthropocene is already a mode of taming novelty, familiarizing the un-
familiar, and rendering the unknown known. But noting that all cognitive ac-
tivities domesticate novelty in one way or another is neither a profound insight nor
a useful one in developing an understanding of how different modes of do-
mestication happen. On this basis, it seems reasonable to distinguish between
efforts directed at capturing experienced novelty and efforts aiming at seeking
precedents for it. My focus here is on how the latter as exemplified by approaches
based on modern historical thinking temporally domesticates the former as
exemplified by the Anthropocene as conceptualized by ESS.
The fact that the notion of the Anthropocene is an invention of ESS does not
mean that it has an authoritative scientific definition. ESS scholars typically do not
aim at such a definition, ferociously debate the onset of the Anthropocene, and
recognize the necessity of humanities and social scientific views that understand
the Anthropocene as a shared predicament (cf. most recently Zalasiewicz et al.,
2021). Yet, even if a purely scientific definition would be of no use even in the
ESS view, it must be equally clear that there are certain central tenets without
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which the ESS Anthropocene as a conceptual effort to capture novelty simply
does not make sense.
Three of these central tenets seem indispensable to the ESS Anthropocene. First,
the notion refers to anthropogenic changes in planetary conditions, that is, in the
condition of the Earth system, meaning that it necessitates viewing the Earth as an
integrated system. Second, in denoting a new condition of the Earth system, it
implies a new geological epochmarked by planetary-scale human agency as attested
to by stratigraphic data. What connects the previous two tenets is the third one: the
specific systemic character of human activity, elevated to the level of other natural
forces. To let ESS articles speak for themselves, consider the claim (Steffen et al.,
2011: 843) that multiple parallel trends—from anthropogenic climate change to
humans “likely driving the sixth major extinction event in Earth history”—provide
“strong evidence that humankind, our own species, has become so large and active
that it now rivals some of the great forces of Nature in its impact on the functioning of
the Earth system.”What the notion of the Anthropocene suggests thereby is that “the
Earth is now moving out of its current geological epoch, called the Holocene,” and
“human activity is largely responsible for this exit” as it “has become a global
geological force in its own right.” Such human-induced transformation of the
condition of the Earth system represents radical novelty and a future radically
different from the past inasmuch as it entails the prospect of “the unexpected crossing
of thresholds that drive the Earth system, or significant subsystems, abruptly into
states delirious or even catastrophic to human well-being” (Rockström et al., 2009).
Temporal domestication at work, part 1: Broad
redefinitions and temporal markers
In illustrating how history domesticates the radical novelty of the Anthropocene
in the aforementioned three steps, I will discuss three examples as embedded in
a longer argument that spans the remaining pages. The rationale behind the
selection is to discuss three examples that extend the Anthropocene further and
further into the past. On this premise, the first example is a passage from the book
The Shock of the Anthropocene: The Earth, History and Us (2016) by Christophe
Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, which extends the Anthropocene back to the
beginning of Western modernity. The second is a passage from Joyce Chaplin’s
article “Can the Nonhuman Speak? Breaking the chain of Being in the An-
thropocene” (2017), which seeks precedents slightly earlier in the early-modern
period. Finally, the third example is the argument of the article “On the Im-
portance of a Date, or Decolonizing the Anthropocene” by Davis and Todd
(2017), which links the Anthropocene with European expansion and the colo-
nization of the Americas.
In discussing the examples, I will begin by introducing the first two extracted
passages and by focusing on the first two steps of temporal domestication. In
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doing so, I will highlight broad redefinitions in bold typeface and underline
temporal markers. As the third step of temporal domestication brings together the
preceding two in a comprehensive picture, I will discuss the third example at
somewhat more length as a culmination of all three domesticating measures put to
work. Additionally, the third example and the third step of domestication will also
be an occasion to bring in the evaluative dimension, showing how the taming
effect of the establishment of continuity entails a devaluation of the future and its
novelty.
In each case, my primary intention is not to challenge the explicit claims of the
texts from which I extract certain passages. So as not to count a very few oc-
casions, I also attempt to refrain from engaging with the explicit arguments or
criticizing the scholarly positions of texts fromwhich I excerpt the passages.What
I hope to show is the function of historicization (temporal domestication) as based
on the modern idea of history—regardless of the scholarly claims of the texts that
include the excerpts I discuss.
Yet, it is clear that the argument of this article entails a particular view and
a specific position in the larger debate, calling for the recognition of the untamed
novelty of the Anthropocene. In considering a mid-twentieth century onset of the
Anthropocene, my view coincides with the majority of the members of the
Anthropocene Working Group (AWG), set up in 2009 to investigate the question
of whether the Anthropocene should be formalized in geological time
(Zalasiewicz et al., 2017). A mid-twentieth century Anthropocene does not mean
that anything prior to that period has no effect whatsoever on how the present
looks. As the multidisciplinary co-authors of a recent Anthropocene article claim
(Zalasiewicz et al., 2021: no page numbers), “a chronostratigraphic Anthropocene
commencing in the mid-20th century definitionally excludes millennia of […]
earlier human influences but this does not decouple it from its historical and
causative links.”
All this being cleared up, let me begin with a passage from The Shock of the
Anthropocene, a brilliant book in many ways. The explicit aim of the book is to
understand the Anthropocene by framing it as being embedded in multiple longer
term narratives of modernity. Most interestingly, Bonneuil and Fressoz (2016: 19)
recognize radical novelty by claiming that “the Anthropocene is an event, a point
of bifurcation in the history of the Earth, life and humans. It overturns our
representations of the world.” Yet, this does not prevent them looking for
precedents:
This is not the first time scientists have attested to or foreseen such human power
over the fate of the planet, whether to celebrate it or as a cause for concern. As
recently as 1778, in his Epochs of Nature volume of Histoire naturelle générale et
particuliére, Comte de Buffon [(2018)] explained that “the entire face of the Earth
today bears the imprint of human power.” (Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016: 4)
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The temporal markers in the passage present what many perceive today as
something previously unknown as if it was already known “as recently as 1778,”
as if it was “not the first time” that we encountered that which we assume to be
new. As a rather common mode of making sense of the world, we habitually
exercise such domestication as a vehicle of understanding, trying to comprehend
personal life events as well as societal phenomena. Just think of how frequently
we have heard in the last decade that the political domain experienced a re-
surgence of populism. Such claims explain the current political landscape by
reference to a new wave of an old approach to politics, conveying the message
that we are confronted with something that we are essentially familiar with, if only
in its previous manifestations. And this is precisely the message of the quoted
passage: the advent of the Anthropocene is the reappearance of the known in
a potentially different shape.
The basis of deploying temporal markers is the alignment of the new with the
old through broad redescriptions that can conveniently apply to both. This
makes it possible to see both the old and the new as parts of the very same
developmental process, which creates the grounds for Bonneuil and Fressoz to
advance seven historical narratives. To see how far redescriptions go exactly, let
me compare the ones in the quoted passage to the ESS Anthropocene. How do the
broad references to “human power over the fate of the planet” and to the “imprint
of human power” that “the entire face of the Earth today bears” fare with the
central tenets of the ESS Anthropocene that hope to play out the novelty of our
predicament? Not spectacularly well, to say the least. For the AWG states with
clarity that “the base of the proposed Anthropocene time unit is not defined by the
beginning of significant human influence upon the Earth” (Zalasiewicz et al.,
2017: 57). In making the case for a mid-twentieth century onset of the An-
thropocene, the AWG does not refer to a broad “imprint of human power” as in the
quoted passage, but to “the rapid increase in scale and extent of global human
impact on the planetary environment, also clearly recognizable from a wide range
of synchronous stratigraphic indicators,” that is, to a “coincidence of marked
inflections in Earth System trends with an array of stratigraphic indicators”
(Zalasiewicz et al., 2017: 57). Plainly speaking, the AWG and the quoted passage
do not seem to talk about the same thing when they both mean the Anthropocene.
The second example, Chaplin’s essay, accentuates the stakes perhaps even
better. As to its explicit aims, it argues that a focus on the modern period and our
retained commitment to modernist values prevent us from seeing that precedents
for the current predicament date back even earlier to early modern times. In
putting temporal domestication to work, the essay proceeds in a slightly less
straightforward way than the previous example, through an engagement with the
question of scale in Dipesh Chakrabarty’s essay, “The Climate of History: Four
Theses” (2009). In its first interpretive move, Chaplin (2017: 522) attributes the
view to Chakrabarty that the “element of scale is assumed to be unprecedented,
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therefore hard for humanity to confront.” Then, in a second move, she challenges
this view by claiming that it reflects
the high-modern assumption that human control of the natural world should be the
default; comprehension is supposed to yield a manageable and predictable future.
But it is not the case that thinking about the enormity of the natural world,
pondering its alterity and complexity, and confronting its resistance to our efforts
to control it are anything new. Each of those dilemmas had been thought about
before the modern period. They are not unprecedented, but their precedents are at
this point sufficiently remote so as to be invisible to scholars who have focused on
modern history. (Chaplin, 2017: 522–523)
In taking the issue with the radical character of the novelty of the Anthro-
pocene condition, the passage turns the premise of Chakrabarty’s engagement
with the Anthropocene upside down. Whereas Chakrabarty (2009) considers the
Anthropocene a challenge to historical thinking, Chaplin’s text places its temporal
markers and broad redefinitions to suggest that historical thinking, instead of
facing a crisis in confronting prospects of the unprecedented, knows the situation
better: we just need to calibrate our retrospective stance and focus on the right
period to see that we have been here before.
If this does not come as a surprise, it is because Chaplin’s text, both in its
strengths and weaknesses, remains indebted to the logic of disciplinary history.
As the scholarly gatekeeper of modern historical thinking, disciplinary history is
a Kuhnian “normal science” in which bringing one’s expertise to the pre-
occupations of the present means typically showing how the past might have
something to say about it. To return to the earlier technology examples, this is how
an ancient history, a medieval history, and an early-modern and modern history
expertise will present us, respectively, robots in Greek mythology (Mayor, 2018),
“medieval robots” (Truitt, 2015), and “androids in the Enlightenment” (Voskuhl,
2013). Although the results are oftentimes fascinating, the shortcomings of
operating in the mode of “business as usual” in facing what may be the para-
digmatic “unusual” case unveil the cracks in the logic and in the entire thought
system.
To get a firmer grasp of these cracks, let me return to the example at hand and
note that stretching familiarity back to time on a longer term necessitates re-
definitions broader and broader the longer one hopes to look back in seeking an
alignment of new and old. This is how, in the quoted passage, the Anthropocene
predicament becomes as broad in the redefinitions as “the enormity of the natural
world” and “its resistance to our efforts to control it.” Thus defined, precedents are
indeed easy to find in the idea of the sublime, which, in the mid-eighteenth-
century writings of Edmund Burke, entails, very conveniently, precisely the very
same “paradoxical allure of something beyond human control” (Chaplin, 2017:
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525) that is a perfect match to the broad redescription of the Anthropocene
condition in the quoted passage. What the result does not match though is the ESS
Anthropocene as introduced earlier. Just as with the previous case, the domes-
tication does not prove to be able to recognize the ESS Anthropocene. Whereas
the very premise of the Anthropocene predicament is the collision of the human
and the natural worlds in which humans become forces of nature, the Burkean
sublime, when connected to nature, concerns an “external nature” (Brady, 2013:
11–46), the grandeur of which appears incomprehensible to the humans who
confront it. And this idea, the very idea of humans being mere observers of nature,
is precisely what the ESS Anthropocene calls into question—as also played out in
the approach of Chakrabarty’s first thesis on “the collapse of the age-old humanist
distinction between natural history and human history” (Chakrabarty, 2009: 201).
To address for a moment the explicit claims of the essay, Chaplin (2017: 528) is
very well aware that “reading Burke into the debates about the Anthropocene
would have to make that new era, in which we seem now to live, less un-
precedented.”Yet she thinks that this may be beneficial, because making the “new
era” “less unprecedented”means making it “less of a surprise, and therefore more
of an obvious responsibility. We have confronted its possibilities before; we can
claim no innocence as an excuse for delayed action.” This is quite an unexpected
twist. Chaplin’s view clearly contradicts my initial contention that taming
prospects of radical novelty through history today appears less and less as a
constructive operation and more and more as one that obstructs action even if
inadvertently and merely functionally. To render this claim plausible, the coming
pages will address the evaluative dimensions of domesticating novelty through
history and feature the third example focused on establishing continuity as the
third step of domestication at work.
The evaluative dimension: Deflating the future
What makes us act when facing planetary-scale catastrophes of our own making?
As we apparently do not seem to do much about changing trajectory, this seems to
be the question of the hour. It would be rather pretentious to suggest an answer on
the remaining few pages. What I can hope to offer—and what this essay is
devoted to—is an answer to the reverse question of what does not make us act
today. To be clear, this relatively modest reverse question (just like the more
ambitious former one) is not directed at action in general. Nor is it directed at
forms of action linked with the aim of realizing the promises of the ideologies and
utopias of Western modernity. Instead, it is devoted to exploring the obstacles to
a specifically precautionary action.
The answer leads to the realm associated with the politics of historical time. As
a point of departure, consider Peter Osborne’s claim (1995: xii) that “modernity is
a form of historical time which valorizes the new as the product of a constantly
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self-negating temporal dynamic.” The aspect that I want to emphasize is the
valorization of the new as a structural feature, which attributes an intrinsic
comparative and evaluative edge to modern historical time. Yet, it seems to me
that the inherent temporal comparison that modern historical time harbors, its
championing of the new against the old, has a specific condition of possibility that
is no longer given: a future conceived in terms of betterment.
The Anthropocene futures discussed above are most certainly not visions of
betterment. According to Assmann (2020: 4), the future “has lost the power to
shed light on the present, since we can no longer assume,” as we did in the
modern time regime, “that it functions as the end point of our desires, goals, or
projections.” Or, as Hartog (2015: 198–200) argued even earlier, the future has
come to be perceived lately under a “precautionary principle,” with respect not
only to ecological and environmental thinking, but also to technological risks.
In such a time regime, the dominant form of “precautionary politics”
(Whiteside, 2006) does not seem to valorize the new. Instead, it attempts to
prevent catastrophic futures and novelties from taking place through “pre-
cautionary action.”
Temporal domestication through history does not seem to fit well with these
premises. The plausibility and the utility of the operation are tied to desirable
futures. Modernity could valorize the new inasmuch as its novelties were tied to
futures that societies hoped to facilitate—and historical thinking was instrumental
to this valorization precisely because of its work of domestication. By taming the
shock of the new, by integrating novelty into a developmental process informed
by modern historical time, temporal domestication effectively rendered the taking
place of the future feasible, desirable, and possible. Today, however, in facing
catastrophic and typically undesired futures, the work of historical domestication
implies an evaluative measure other than valorization: deflation. Integrating
catastrophic futures into processual schemes by linking old and new in a deep
continuity deflates both the novelty and the shock of the catastrophic character of
today’s future, just as well as the sense of urgency conveyed by such character.
How so? Precisely by making the future appear “less unprecedented” as was
the intention of Chaplin (2017: 528) by aligning the Anthropocene with the early-
modern sublime. In the Anthropocene, however, it is the very radicality of the
future that calls for “precautionary action,” and this radicality is strongly tied to
unprecedentedness. And what triggers action is not merely the “catastrophe,” the
“threat,” and the “risk,” but also the uncertainty, the unknowability, and the
unfathomability mingling with them. According to Van Asselt and Vos (2006:
315), the precautionary principle is linked with “uncertain risk” that they associate
with “inherent unpredictability.” Furthermore, as Aradau and VanMunster (2011)
show, in today’s “politics of catastrophe,” it is the unknown that renders the future
“actionable.”
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What I want to indicate by citing risk and security studies is that domesticating
futures of the unknown and futures of uncertain risks through history deflates
these futures by deflating their unknowability and “inherent unpredictability.”
The more we claim to know the future and its novelty, the more we make them
appear “less unprecedented,” the less we conceive of them in terms of uncertain
risks and demand precautionary action and the less we render them “actionable.”
And the means of deflating the future, I want to argue, is the third step of temporal
domestication: the establishment of continuity.
Temporal domestication at work, part 2:
Establishing continuity
The Anthropocene debate, largely revolving around identifying a start date, offers
a variety of “historical” takes—not only in disciplinary history but all across the
disciplinary landscape—that integrate the Anthropocene into a larger pattern of
developmental continuity. Whereas ESS Anthropocene futures anticipate abrupt
transformations in the Earth system driven by human activity as a natural force,
“historical” approaches flatten out the abruptness of the transition and smoothen
past, present, and future into a deep continuity by viewing the occurrence and the
prospect of novelty as outcomes of deep processes unfolding over time.
To an early twenty-first-century human and social scientific sensitivity,
capitalism and colonial practices appear as the most prominent bases on which the
Anthropocene can be linked with a longer trajectory in regards to developments in
the human world. As a prominent example, consider the following reasons for
linking the onset of the Anthropocene with colonization from Davis and Todd’s
essay (2017: 764) aimed at decolonizing the Anthropocene:
We make the case for colonialism as the start date of the Anthropocene for two
reasons: the first is to open up the geologic questions and implications of the
Anthropocene beyond the realm of Western and European epistemology to think
with Indigenous knowledges fromNorth America; the second is to make a claim that
to use a date that coincides with colonialism in the Americas allows us to understand
the current state of ecological crisis as inherently invested in a specific ideology
defined by proto-capitalist logics based on extraction and accumulation through
dispossession – logics that continue to shape the world we live in and that have
produced our current era.
The ethical imperatives of the colonial Anthropocene approach are indeed
commendable. There is also little doubt about the role of “the proto-capitalist
logics based on extraction and dispossession” in the many crises of the An-
thropocene. But can the approach fare equally well in regards to a potential
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resonance with ESS efforts aimed at capturing the novelty of the Anthropocene
predicament?
To begin with, consider that the colonial continuity thesis builds on the
previous steps of temporal domestication: it is anchored in a broad redefinition of
the Anthropocene. As their starting point to establish continuity, Davis and Todd
(2017: 768–769) turn to Crutzen and Stoermer’s short essay (2000), published in
Global Change Newsletter, that popularized the notion of the Anthropocene and
credited a few ideas that they thought may be looked at as forerunners of the
Anthropocene notion. Among these few ideas, Davis and Todd find the notion of
the noösphere. The notion is mentioned twice in Crutzen and Stormer’s essay,
which consists of seven paragraphs altogether (of which the last is a one-sentence
acknowledgment). The first mention concerns how Vladimir Vernadsky, Pierre
Teilhard de Chardin, and Edouard Le Roy “coined the term ‘noösphere,’ the
world of thought, to mark the growing role played by mankind’s brainpower and
technological talents in shaping its own future and environment” (Crutzen and
Stoermer, 2000: 17). The second mention follows the prediction that “without
major catastrophes” “mankind will remain a major geological force for millennia,
maybe millions of years, to come.” It calls for the development of “a world-wide
accepted strategy leading to sustainability of ecosystems against human induced
stresses,” which would require “intensive research efforts and wise application of
the knowledge thus acquired in the noösphere, better known as knowledge or
information society,” and which would point to the task “ahead of the global
research and engineering community to guide mankind towards global, sus-
tainable, environmental management” (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000: 18). Whereas
the first mention of Crutzen and Stoermer associates the noösphere with human
activity shaping the Earth, the second links it with the more contemporary terms,
“knowledge society” and “information society.”
Davis and Todd take issue with the notion of the Anthropocene more through
delivering a critique of the notion of noösphere and less through focusing on the
work of Earth system science. They claim that Crutzen and Stoermer “rely upon
the concept of the ‘noösphere’ to articulate their position” and that “the noö-
sphere, while a generative category, which Crutzen and Stoermer credit with their
thinking on the Anthropocene itself, replicates a Euro-Western division of mind/
thought from land when it is framed as the business of ‘research and engineering’”
(Davis and Todd, 2017: 768). But how exactly do they arrive at this claim? In
trying to establish a close link between the noösphere and the Anthropocene,
Davis and Todd, first, need to disregard all the other ideas that Crutzen and
Stoermer present as ideas that played out the human impact on the environment
prior to the notion of the Anthropocene. The noösphere is only one of many.
Second, they also need to overlook that Crutzen and Stoermer use the notion as
a synonym to the notions “knowledge society” and “information society.” Third,
they need to remain inattentive to the differences between the different versions of
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the noösphere notion as advocated by Vernadsky, de Chardin, and Le Roy (see
Steffen et al., 2011: 844–845). Davis and Todd’s interpretation (2017: 768)
emphasizes that “the noösphere places thought above the biosphere and geo-
sphere, and is framed as a teleological progression that follows the development
of the earth’s geological features and biota, as demonstrated by de Chardin’s
writings on the concept.”However, as Renn (2020: 380) points out, it was only de
Chardin for whom “the appearance of ‘Mind’ as a geological force represented
a new stage in cosmogenesis.”
This is the ground on which Davis and Todd (2017: 769) end up claiming that
“in tethering the Anthropocene to colonialism, as we hope to show here, the links
between the emergence of ecological disaster and concepts such as the noösphere
become clear” and that “the noösphere which considers thought separate from –
and above – geology and biota replicates the foundational and epistemic violence
of European colonialism which Lewis and Maslin propose caused the
Anthropocene.”1
The Anthropocene is nevertheless not the noösphere, let alone de Chardin’s
version of it. At least not in ESS, where the Anthropocene has more to do with
anthropogenic transformations of the Earth system and less with considering
“thought separate from – and above – geology and biota.” Nor is it in the
publications by members of the AWG—including historian John McNeill along
with Earth system scientists such asWill Steffen—where it is clearly declared that
“the diverse notions of the noösphere, or similar ideas under different termi-
nology, are, however, not equivalent to the new concept of the Anthropocene”
(Steffen et al., 2011:845).
The temporal domestication of perceived radical novelty as carried out by the
colonial Anthropocene approach, just as well as in the previous two examples,
may be beneficial in enabling us to see deep patterns that could be effective in
bringing about the present predicament. At the same time, the approach comes
with serious shortcomings: in trying to connect with the past by smoothing past,
present, and future into a pattern of deep continuity, it disconnects from the
discourse in which the Anthropocene was proposed as a conceptual effort to
capture radical novelty. Instead of joining a shared discussion on novelty and
Anthropocene futures, it initiates a discussion about something else: the survival
and present effectiveness of the past, making the future appear to be the de-
scendant condition of the past. Where does this leave us? Recall the argument of
Chaplin (2017: 522) that thinking in terms of unprecedentedness about the scale
of the Anthropocene that escapes human confines reflects the high-modern as-
sumption that human control over nature is the default mode of conceiving of the
relationship between the human and the natural worlds. At the same time, the
default “historical” approach of temporal domestication entails an opposite pitfall
as another mode of claiming human control: as a form of cognitive control,
historical domestication renders the unknown known by temporal alignment. It
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renders the radical and uncontrolled novelty of the future humanly controllable by
creating the conditions of temporal comparability and temporal commensurability
through a deflation of the new to the rank of the old.
Finally, for the sake of clarity again, it is not my intention to argue that long-
standing capitalist modes of production, colonial practices, and techno-
managerial and anthropocentric patterns of thought and action play no role
whatsoever in bringing about the predicament we associate today with the
Anthropocene. They play a tremendous role. What I hope to show is only that the
focus on attributing responsibilities for past occurrences conceived of as leading
up to the catastrophes of the present and the future over the course of historical
processes of deep continuity, however justified and ethically compelling it may
be, amounts to the deflation of the future and the domestication of its novelty.
I hope to raise attention thereby to the complexity of the situation in which we find
ourselves today, grappling with equally compelling but largely contradictory
imperatives in our efforts to understand the world. In doing so, we have, I believe,
an alternative to mechanically appealing to temporal domestication: finding ways
to recognize and affirm a multiplicity of kinds of transformation and change over
time in what I will call a plurihistoricity of coexisting modes of “historical”
transitions.
Recognizing plurihistoricity
Modern societies liked to think that “everything has a history” or that nothing
exists “outside history.” As Grossman (2015) at the American Historical As-
sociation recently testified, we still like to think that. And we seem pretty
successful in giving a history to practically everything. So successful, indeed, that
Nandy (1995: 46) even claims that “historical consciousness now owns the globe.
Even in societies known as ahistorical, timeless, or eternal – India for example –
the politically powerful now live in and with history.” In the meantime, within the
Western world, according to Davies (2006: 1), history simply dominates “the
public mind: its hold over the social imagination is total.”
Nandy and Davies are not content merely with performing fierce criticisms of
the pervasiveness of historical thought; they explicitly attempt to break free
from it. In doing so, instead of seeking alternative histories, Nandy (1995: 53)
goes as far as to seeking “alternatives to history.” He hopes to find them with the
“dissenting minority” of “ahistoricals,” suspecting that “broadly speaking
cultures tend to be historical in only one way, whereas each ahistorical culture is
so in its own unique style” (Nandy 1995: 46–47). Davies (2006: 249–250), on
the other hand, seems less optimistic in contending that “society can’t help being
historical” and that historical thinking “defaults to knowledge already known.”
What he suggests is, as simple as it sounds, to think—although in a very specific
sense. Davies (2006: 251) attributes to thinking a “disruptive potential” that is
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somehow—in a way that he does not reveal much about—supposed to gesture
towards timelessness through “timeless works.”
It seems to me that Nandy and Davis are rightly suspicious of the modern
obsession with historicizing literally everything. Yet, even though I agree that the
last two centuries really overdid endowing the world with history in the modern
way, I do not share the deep exasperation about a historicized culture that underpins
Davies’s writings because I do not think with Nandy that there is only one way of
being “historical” that we could set against the multiplicities of being “ahistorical.”
Nor do I think with Davies that timelessness would be the alternative to the modern
idea of history. More importantly, I am not interested in proposing something else
instead of what we have.What I attempted to show in this article is that today we do
in fact think about change over time in ways other than the overwhelming
processual one that the modern idea of history and its modern historical time would
allow. To illustrate my point, I used the example of human-induced abrupt
transformations in the Earth system as captured by the notion of the Anthropocene
in ESS and analyzed how processual historical approaches carry out the operation
of temporal domestication on the ESS Anthropocene.
In place of a conclusion, what I hope to offer is the suggestion to take seriously
not only the plurality of temporalities but also the multiplicity of “historical”modes
of change over time. Historical time is not only about the multiple speeds and
rhythms of processual change. It should also be about the multiple modes of
transitional relations between apprehended pasts and anticipated futures in a variety
of practices that, in a joint endeavor with Marek Tamm, we call modalities of
“historical futures” (Simon and Tamm, 2021). The ESS Anthropocene with its
abrupt transformations represents but one instance in an abundance of new mo-
dalities of “historical” transitions, changes, and transformations. Analogous to the
multiple temporalities and pluritemporalities (Jordheim, 2014; Fryxell, 2019) that
frame our lives, we navigate in a plurihistoricity of coexisting historicities as
multiple configurations of the past–present–future relationship. If there is one
“regime of historicity” (Hartog, 2015) that dominates our “historical” existence and
thinking, it is the one that enables a plurality of historicities in various domains of
life, societal practices, natural phenomena, and their complex entanglements. We
only need to find ways to recognize this plurihistoricity without trying habitually to
fit other-than-processual historical transitions into the processual pattern of his-
torical time we inherited from Western modernity.
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Note
1. As to the referenced article of Lewis and Maslin (2015), it proposes two choices for the
onset of the Anthropocene: 1610 and 1964, favoring the former. Davis and Todd (2017:
772) credit Lewis and Maslin with an argument for the former and mention the latter as
“the Anthropocene Working Group’s preferred date of the 1964.” In fact, the AWG
considers mid-twentieth century and 1964 as separate options. The AWG voting results
for the onset at the time of the article of Davis and Todd were the following: “∼7 ka, 0;
∼3 ka, 1.3; 1610 Orbis, 0; ∼1800, 0; ∼1950, 28.3; ∼1964, 1.3; diachronous, 4; un-
certain, 0; abstain, 0” (Zalasiewicz et al., 2017: 58). Davis and Todd are right that the
AWG favors another chronology, but they mistake the second suggestion of Lewis and
Maslin for the AWG position. In reality, the AWG engaged in a critical manner with
Lewis and Maslin’s both options (Zalasiewicz et al., 2015).
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